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~OWER OP CONGRESS TO IMPEA~ 
AND TRY A PRESIDENT AFTER HE 
HAS RESIGNED; AND POWER TO 
CONTINUE A TRIAL OF AN IM-
PEACHMENT BEGUN IN ONE SES-
SION AND CARRIED OVER INTO A 
SUBSEQUENT SESSION OF CON-
GRESS 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on 
September 17, 1974, I Inserted in the 
REcoRD a memorandum on Questions 
dealing with the power of the Congress 
to Impeach and try a President after he 
has resigned and the question of con-
tinuing a trial of an impeachment be-
gun in one session and carried on into a 
subsequent session of Congress. The 
memorandum was prepared by the 
School of Law of the University of Mon-
tana. 
I now have an addendum prepared by 
Gardner Cromwell, professor at the Mon-
tann. School of Law. 
Mr. President, I ask urumlmous con-
sent that my insertion under date of 
September 17, 19'14, beginning on page 
816725 and concluding on page 816'128 
be reinserted in the RECORD in ita original 
form and thnt th!s addendum be printed 
ln ~SeQUenee. 
There being no bjectlon, the material 
was ordered to be printed in the 
RECORD, as follows: 
PoWEll Oll' Omma!:sa To z-cB .t.N11 TIIY A 
PBKsmi:NT Arn:R Bll Roll RaltJNED; AND 
PoWEll To Co~ • TJwu. ow AN IM-
:PEACRKJ:NT BzG'D'N IN ONE S.EIIIUON AND 
C.t.&UED 0VJ:& Ilno .t. SI.TIISEQUENT S>:sfiiON 
OP CO!fi!OIU!I!8 
Mr. MI.N1P'tJ!:1,D J!r. l'restdent, on August 
4, 1974, durtng the l.mpea.chment proceed-
ings In th& House of Representatives, I 
requested the very a.ble and cU8t1D!{Ulshed 
law faculty a.t t.be Unlveral.ty of Monta.nn 
School of Law, Ulraugh Its dea.n, Robert E. 
Sullivan, to cons~r and provide me and the 
Senate wiUJ. acl.vlce and counael concerning 
two COL\.StltuUow>.l queetlona, whloh at UJ.at 
time COil!rontcd the Scnate and the Na-
tion.. One question dealt with the power o! 
Congrcas to Impeach e.nd try a Presl~ent 
after he ha. !'eSigned. a.n<1 Ule other related 
to e. oon\lnuatlon of a trial or an Impeach-
men t begun 1n one llCMion and C&l'rled over 
1ntQ a subsequent eeesion of Congreaa. 
Dean Sulllva.n responded to my request 
and hM eubmtttcd a memorandum prt?pared 
\Ulder ~ho cll:rectlon ol Prot. Gardner Crom-
well of the Uulverel~y of Montana School 
of Law. 
WhUe the overrtding b.•;ue ot Impeach-
ment proceed.lnp hM been rendered moot 
by UJ.e accept.&nce by the Houae or Repre-
sentatives of the report or Ita Committee on 
th& Judlcle.ry, It ls my judgment that thE> 
work product of this legnl rese1lrch endeavor 
by the Unlvemlty of Montana Is of slgnlf-
lcance and llhoUld be included In the public 
reoord. In pul'Btii&DCe of that objective, also, 
1 have forwanled. a oopy o1 Ule memorandum 
to Senator HowAIUl C.t.NNON', cba.lrman of 
the Cornmltteo on Rules and Admlnlatra-
tlOD, Mll::l.llg that he review tlle conclusions 
ot thJa memonnd.um to doMrm.ine w1lether 
any c:bangc:oa In SeaaM rules might be sug-
gested In vtew ot the point& considered. 
Moreover, to enable the full Senate, and 
others interested in theso Issues, to havo 
the ben efit of these views, I ask unanimous 
cone.ent that the memorandum be printed 
at thls point In the R.Ecoan, aa well a.s a 
letter which I have received !rom Dean 
Robert E. Bulllvan of the School of Law. 
University ol Montana under date of 
Augus t Zl , 1974. 
There being no objection, the !E>tter and 
memorandum were ordered to be printed 
In the RJJCOIID, 11:1 foDowu: 
'11Niv!:R.trrTT OP Mo:STA N A, 
Mu.roula, Mcmt., Augu~t 23, 1974 
Ron. MDD: li4ANSrrl:LD, 
Senate JlfStm'i'J IAG4a, S~rnAte Of!lce Build-
In", Wa.shfngton, D.C 
DEAR SENATOa J.l.t.NSJ'IELD: In responso to 
your request of Augul!t 'J', I am enclosing a 
memorandum by Profea.:Jr Gardner Crom-
well of ou r law fa.culty. As you may l<now, 
Prof~ eromwun te&cbea Constitutional 
Law and bas been a member of our law tac-
nlty since 195'1. Be pract1ced tor a time a1ter 
graduation from law achool a.nd bas \he rep-
utation oi an acoompllahed legal acholar and 
a hard-nosed reall.s~. 
All tbe memoran<tam tnmcatee, there are 
no dotl:nltlve a.DII'!I'elll to the questions prt--
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, seated. Souroo material Is not extensive, but 
there Is suffi<:ient basis to state conclusions 
on the bast.. or probabUitle.s--=ncluslons 
that rellect what a court would do I! the 
questions were pre sen ted tor decision. 
I appreciate the opportunity to submit 
this memorandum to you. It enables us to 
reciprocate 1 n a small way for your exten.sl ve 
and coutlnumg efforts to assiSt the Univer-
sity of Montana. 
Best personal regards. 
Sincerely yours, 
ROBERT E . SULIJVAN, 
Dean,SchoolofLaw. 
CONSTrTUTION.U. RF.SPONSIBILITY OF CONGRESS 
To Pu'astTE IMPEACHME!'.'T AND TlUAL REME-
DIES IN A PaOCEIWlNO ONCE COMMENCED OR 
AFTER A PRESIDENT RESIGNS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Whether the Congress has power to Im-
peach and t7)' a President after he has 
reslg'nlld. 
n. Whether ~he Sen<ate has power to con-
tinue the trial or an Impeachment begun In 
one Session of Congress Into the next Session. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I . Probably 
II. Probably not. 
Prellml.nary Question: Whether determina-
tions of these questions are subject to Judi-
cial review. 
Conclu.sion: Probably. 
The prellml.nary question raises the Issue 
of the JustlclabUity or so-called "political 
questions." Or, as the Supreme Court put It, 
In Baker v. CaTT, 369 U .8. 166, 210 ( 1961) : 
"The nonJustlclabUity of a political ques-
tion 1s prl.mar1Jy a function of the separation 
of powers." This memorandum approaches 
the queRtlons presented from the viewpoint 
of the lawyer, not tha.t of politician or his-
torian, so most of the ma.terlals cited will be 
"leg<al." Because the questions presented are 
unusual (I! not unique), there 18 not much 
legal authority a.va!lable. 
The Baker deolslon culled criteria from 
other ca.'!e8 (the Court called them "common 
characteristics") for Identifying cases Involv-
Ing political questions. At p . 217 of 369 U.S ., 
It listed these · 
(1) A textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment or the Issue to a coordi-
nate political department; 
(2) A lack or judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving It; 
(S) The lmpOSBibUity or deciding without 
an Initial policy determination or 11 kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; 
(4) The lmposslbUlty or a court's under-
taking Independent resolution without ex-
pressing lack or the respect due coordinate 
branches of government: 
(5) An unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already 
made; 
(6) The potentiality of embarrassment 
from multl.ta.rlous pronouncements by vari-
ous departments on one question. 
Thereafter, in Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U.S. 486 (1969). the Court applied the Baker 
criteria to Adam Clayton Powell's declaratory 
judgment suit claiming that the House of the 
90th Congress had unconstitutionally re-
fused to seat him. Because the United Sbates 
District Court had dismiSsed Powell's peti-
tion •·tor want or jurisdiction of the subject 
matter," the Supreme Court considered the 
question of justlficlablllty. Particularly, the 
Court detennined the "textually demonstra-
ble commitment" and the scope or that com-
mitment. The constitutional text Involved 
was that portion or Article I, § 6, which makes 
the House of Representatives "the Judge o! 
the QU61lftcatlons of Its own Members." 
It ts suf!lclent for the purposes of this 
memorandum to record that the Supreme 
Court decided that It had the power to 
sepamtely construe that prov~l.on and to 
conclude tbat the provision "18 at most 'a. 
textually demon.strable commitment' to Con-
gress to judge the quallfication.s expressly 
set forth In the Constltutlon. Therefore, the 
. . • doctrine does not ba.r Federal courts 
from adjudicating petitioner's claims." (Em-
phasis added.) (395 U.S. at 546 ) 
Most recently, the Supreme Court assumed 
jurisdlctlont.n U.S. v. Nixon, (No 73- 1766), 42 
L.W. 5237 (7/ 2<l/74). On appeal was the Di.s-
trlct .Judge's order to the President to pro-
duce "certain tapes, memoz-anda, papers, 
trani'Crlpte, or other writings" allegedly rele-
vant to criminal proceedings brought by the 
Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court up-
held that order and the Dl.strlct Judge's 
ruling that the judiciary, not the President, 
was the final arbIter of a claim of executl ve 
privilege. The Court rejected the Pre.sldent's 
claim that the doctrine of separation of 
powers prevented judicial review or a Presi-
dent 's determination that the privilege ap-
pUed. Espeotally relevant to this heading Is 
the following language: 
"In the performance of assigned constitu-
tional duties. each branch of the Govern-
ment must initially interpret the Constitu-
tion, and the Interpretation of Its powers by 
any branch Is due great respect from the 
others. The Pres ident's counsel, 1!1.8 we have 
noted, reads the Constitution as providing 
an abSOlute privilege of confidentiality for 
all presldenblal communications. Many deci-
slon.s of this Court, however, have unequiv-
ocally reaf!lrmed the holding of Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that 'tt Is em-
phatically the prov ince and duty of the judi-
cial department to say what the law is.' Id., 
at 177." (Emphasis added.) 42 L.W. at 5243.) 
One more decision must be dlscus.sed under 
this heading, U.S. v . Smith, 266 u .s . 6 ( 1931), 
concerned the application of certain Senate 
rules to action by the Pre9ldent. The facts 
were these : The President had transmitted 
to the Senate the nomination of Smith to 
the F .P .O. The ~ate conllrmea the nomina-
tion, ordered that the resolution of confirma-
tion be forwarded to the President, and ad-
journed (!rom December 20 to January 5 ) 
all on the same day. On December 22, the 
Secretary of the Senate notified the Prescient 
ol the confirmation, the President commls-
•loned S mit.h and named him chairman, and 
Smith took the oath and began work. 
On January 5 . when the Senate returned, 
a motion to reconsider the confirmation of 
Smith wu properly made under SeiUI/te rules. 
It paased, as did o. motion to ask the Presi-
dent to return the original resolution of 
confirmation. The President was not11l.ed. He 
reruRed to accede to the request on the 
ground that Smith had been properly ap-
pointed. Thereafter, the Sena.te asked the 
dlstrtct attorney of the District of Columbia 
to bring ~ quo warranto proceeding. 
The Supreme Court stated that the sole 
question was one or law: Old the Senate 
have the power it asserted? The answer to 
the question, the Court said, "depends pri-
marily upon the applicable Senate rules." 
(286 U.S. at SO.) The Court made plain that 
the questton concerned construction of the 
rules, not their constitutionality, clearly rec-
ognizing that It had no concern with "wis-
dom or folly," only power. The significance 
of the Smith dectslon ·to this heading 18 em-
phased In this quotation: 
"As the construction to be given to the 
rules affects pcrson1 other than members of 
the Senate, the question presented is of ne-
cessity a JUdicial one." • (Emphasis added.) 
(286 U.S. at 33.) ' 
This position is significant, too, to a mat-
ter considered under the second question 
presented- present "Senate rules and their 
relation to Impeachment. In the Smith opin-
ion, following the language quoted. above, 
the Court stated that It "must give great 
weight to the Sene.te's present construction 
or Its own rules," but that tt was not pre-
cluded from mak.ing its own Interpretation 
of them. 
• A related view was expressed by the 
court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Nelson v. U.S., 208 F.2d 505, 
513 (1953), cert. den. 346 US. 827 (1953) : 
"Though 11 court oan no more enJoin a con-
greoolonal committee from making an un-
constitutional search and seizure than It 
can enjoin Congress from pasalng au un-
constitutional blll [citing Hearst v. Black, 
87 F.2d 68 (1936)}, a court does have -the 
power and duty to deny legal elfect to either 
In an action before lt." A similar statement 
ami application appears In Fischler t>. Mc-
Carthy, 117 P . Supp. 643 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1954), ajJ' d . 216 F.2d 164 (1954) . 
Addendum: Somewhat related to the pre-
liminary question 18 another posed by Raoul 
Berger In IMPEACHMENT: THE CON-
STITU'TIONAL PROBLEMS (Harvard, 1973). 
Chapter ni, entitled ''Judicial Review," re-
fers to some or the matters cilscusaed un-
der this heading, Including PoweU v. Mc-
Cormack. Berger recognized that "!rom 
Story onward," (Including Prof. Herbert 
Wechsler), the view has been that the Sen-
ate "has the last word." But, taking ac-
count of constitutional gulil'antees o! tn-
cilvldual freedoms, tnter alia, he wrote: 
"Constitutional limits, as Powell v. Mc-
Cormack again reminds us, are subject to 
judicial enforcement; and I would urge 
that judlctal review of impeachment Is re-
quired to protect the other branches from 
Congress' arbitrary will." (Emphasis added.) 
(Berger, IMPEACHMENT, p. 119.) 
Irving Brant, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS 
AND ERRORS (Knopf, 1973) presents a 
different argument [pp. 182-1971 that, I! 
Impeachment In fact amounte to a bUl of 
attainder, the judiciary has power to act. 
Bates, Book Review [Berger and Brant 
books on IMPEACHMENT, 25 Stan. L . 
Rev. 908, 925 (1973) states: "Berger a.nci 
Brant have, by their analyses, considerably 
undermlnd the traditional view that judi-
cial review or Impeachments Is unavallable." 
. .. These authors, almost alone among 
constitutional schola.rs, have developed ar-
guments !or Judicial review that the Oourt 
might adopt." 
On the other hand, W. W. WUloughby (3 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 01" THE 
UNITED STATES, p. 1651, 1929) a.sserted 
flatly : "It Is scarcely necesaary to say that 
the proceedings and determinations of tl"le 
Senate when sitting a.s a court of Impeach-
m ent are notsulbject to review In any other 
court." Broderick, Cttfzens' Gutde to Im-
peachment of a Prestdent .· Problem Areas, 
23 Cath U. L . Rev. 205, 237 (1973) makes 
the same "MBUmption," but t!\kes account 
or Berger's contrary view. 
DISCUSSION' 
I. Whether the Congress has power to 
impeach and try a President after he has 
resigned. 
There l.s very little precedent or discus-
sion avallable. The Associated Pre.ss wire 
carried au item (Spokane, Washington, 
Spokesman-Review. Sunday, August 11, 
1974, p . 3, col. 7) quoting an ACLU demand 
for Impeachment despite resignation, based 
on the 1676 Impeachment of ex-Secreta.ry 
of War Belknap. 
In the most recent of his two timely books 
[Executive Prlvllege: A Oonstltutlonal Myth 
(Harvard 1974) ], Raoul Berger referred to 
the Belknap situation. In discussing Preel· 
dent Andrew Jackson's refusal to furnish 
certain material at the request of Congress. 
Berger wrote : 
" . .. Jackson was clearly wrong, unless we 
are to assume that the power to tnvesttgate 
executive conduct 1s cut off by termination 
of official service." (Emphasis added.) (Berg-
er, ,Executive Privilege, p. 182.) 
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No lH) to u nten t' 
... -ns ' qunrely raised In 
• hm.- •• o! Om s Secrctarv o! 
v.. W Bellr.L....p, and the SenaWI ruled 
' ha.d n t I06t jLll'1lidlctlon by virtue 
Be knAp a rest nat.lon', 3 W W. Wlllough-
1 c rut tuCionaZ LaU' of the United 
1 H9 (New Y rk 1929 
t r as It oc the r~feren e to W 1-
Dut, r r U e purposes 
It Is Imp rtnnt to rc-
lNO. 5) to Ul w nough-
t upon five parate oc-
1 peac n t proc dl s again t 
f t1 r 1 j dge wero dr ppcd by the Hou e 
11. t e It wa.« not ed tha ea h had resigned. 
B l.kn p 11.as a ulttcd. A Trl' on Fed-
eral Impeachments S~mpson (Scholarly 
Rc urc Inc. 1973: first printed 1916) 
• oz.talns ( p - 3 205) an abridgement o! 
the Belknap lmpe chm('nt trial, taken from 
"Proccedlngs of the Senate sitting !or the 
trial ot Wt,uam w. Belknap, 9 ( 1876) ." 
It con ude with this sentence: 'He wo.s 
acqu ted upon th ground that he had re-
lil 1 ed his o ce Secretary or \\'ar, and 
Ills r nat on b d been accepted by tho 
1 r •Ide• n co1 ple of hours before t.lle net ual 
adopLiou r t.n articles o! irup~l\rl&ment by 
tho llmu;c ·· 1 lrnp on Troail~e. p 20" ) 
Urnnt Impea hn ent, ~upra. treat., of th~ 
Belknap trial In Cha.ptcr VIII. He rrport.• 
that 37 senntors vot.ed for comlctlou (4 
short or the two-thirds ne~eJSru"y) nnd 25 
tor acquit al Twenty-two• or the latter 
number ga e aa their reason that the Senate 
h d no jurisdiction over a civil officer who 
resigned before he 11>as Impeached 
l''lnally, under thiS heading, 1t Is ernpha -
~l~ed th:'lt the last clause of Art I f 3, pro-
lldes n t only !or removal from office as a 
Judgment ln a ca:;e of Impeachment, but per 
mlts "dlsquallflcat on to bold and enjoy any 
omco or honor, -rru t or Profit under tho 
United States" Be er's footn tc No. 114 (p. 
182), referred to above, cites Instances o! re-
quc.su by Secretary ot the Treasury Wolcott 
( 1800) and Vice President Calhoun (1 826) to 
the House to investigate their respectl\c p er-
iol'DlADoes In olfice ~!nee vacated Then ap-
pears this eenten e . ' And, II thr derellctlous 
warrant, lmpc hm nt can follow nod result 
1n dlllQua llllcaUon to hold otll e' 
II Whether the Senate bas pow('r to con-
t inue the tnal o! ar Impeachment begun In 
one Se l<'n of Con r~SI! Into the nel!t Ses-
Gion 
'l'he only ftat answ~r appears In "Jetrer-
eon ft Manual.' reproduced In R ule5 a nd 
Manunl United States S enate lfl?3 t!11rd Con-
~. 1st l!eS31on-&na.te Doc. No. 93-1); 
"Ooo t1nuance An Impeachment Is not d l.s-
continued by the dissolution of Parliament, 
but may be r umcd by the new Parliament 
T. Rny 383, 4 Com Journ <!3 Dec. Jn70: 
Lord's Journ Mny 15, 1791, 2 Woods, 61 8." 
(Ruloo and Manual. p. 665). Rule XIII o! the 
Senate's Rule !or Impeachment Trials does 
not speak to the I ue. providing that nd-
Jourument of the lmpea.chment tnul doe~ not 
nd)ourn the S nate (Rules and Manual, p. 
140 ) Llkcwl e W11lou hby s stntemen l Is not 
r n th pont He arg e that dlswlutlon or 
the II ou e by n.1l y to crlnunal proceed-
In and the F.ngll 1 practl e ou ht not to 
term e tt 1 arge3 (WIIIoughb , supra, 
f 93 ~. p 1151 ) 
To some "xtcnt the nnswer to the <ines-
tlon pre uted d<'pcnds upon \l.heU>er the 
character or U1e S nate when trvlng an 1m-
pea hruen IS eo ered from that of lcgls-
latl c bod to p vent the application o r 
ell' ~ o c u ern! the ('lfect of adjourn-
ment Ext tlng pr "edcnt relates to the lat-
ter. But Willoughby, 11upra asserts (I 932, p. 
1~50) that tho "Senate, when trying im-
peachments, sits 1 ot M a lc lslatl\e but M 
WU ougllby a11 a, gives the figure or 
'twenty 
a jud.Jclal body." His rea.oou for making the> 
L>Sertlon, however, appeo.ra renl\led by the 
next sentence which suggest!! that the Sen-
a w has "at least a moral obllgn tlon ' t o npply 
j udicial procedures. 
In nn extensive article entitled Federal 
I mpeachments, 64 U. Penn. L . Rev. 651 {1916) 
reprinted 1n Treat!Be cited aupra, Simpson 
poses the quest ion (pp. 667--676): wrn what 
ca pacity does the Senate sit upon the trial o! 
nn lmpoachment?" He answers the question, 
after cons ideration or his to rical ;>rccedent, 
thus· "The Senate, then being a court, or 
proceedi ng a3 iJ it w ere, ••• . " (Emphasis 
added l (p . 674.) Much of the ten pages de-
voted to d iscussion o! the question relates to 
the manner 1n which the Senators, In Im-
peachment trials, have dcnom!na.tcd the Sen-
ate--o.a " court" or as " high court of lm-
prechment ." But th e more telling precedent 
ls this (from p . 668): "The matter came up 
d urin g the lmpeachement of President J ohn-
son. It Is said ln Hinds' Prececten ts of the 
Ilouae of Represcn tati z:es [Vol. 3, par. 2057 
(1907) l : 
"'In 1868, a fter mature consid eration , the 
Sena te decided t h at It sat ! or Impeachment 
t r lnls 1\8 t h e Se nat.e nnd not as a court . ..• 
A n amtl<lt y le~t t he Chlet Justice might hrw e 
11 vote scern" to hrwe led the Sennte t o drop 
the word., "lllgh Court o! I m peachment' 
! rom Its ru les.' " 
It Ia wor t h obser ving U1a t the use o r 
&uch phrases as "Htgh Court or Impeach-
ment" may Ignore t he historical fact tha t 
t he Hou se a! Lords has performed both 
l<'glsla.tlve and judicial fun ctions. To the 
very recent past: Press reports or proposals 
to change t he Senate Rules to deprive t h e 
Chief J ustice o! a vote do not affect the 
analysis wh ich follows.) 
On severa l occasions, the Supreme Court 
ha.-. treated thl' question o! the effect o! ad-
journment a! the Congress or the House. 
There have been t wo subjects lnvolved- (1) 
the extent o r the power to punish for con-
tempt , a n d (2) the veto power or the 
President. 
( 1) The e arliest ca~e wa.s Ander son t:' , 
Dunn, 6 Wheat, 204 (1821). There, the ques-
tion wa.s t he extent of the power of Congr!llls 
to lmprl.son for contempt. The Supreme 
Court ruled that t h e duration o r Imprison -
ment was set by the life of the Congt'('SS. 
For p urpoaes o! t his heading, the f ollowing 
langunge IS slgnit1cant : 
" ... althou gh the legislative po..,er con-
tinu es pnpetual, the legislati l.'e body cca.ses 
to cxtst on the moment of Its ad.journmcnt 
or periodical dissolution." (Emphasis added ) 
( 6 Wheat , at 231.) 
That conclu.slon was reamrmed In Mar-
shall v . Gorcton, 243 U .S . 621, 6-12 (1910) . 
Both or those declsion.s are cite d In sup-
pert o r a footnote s tat ement appearing In 
Gojark v. U .S., 384 U.S 702, 707 (1965). That 
case Involved an Indictment and convic-
tion for contempt o! Congress u n der statute, 
a nd the footnote related t o an assertion by 
the United Bta.tes that ther~ WIIS a " con-
tinuing 1nv~tlgatlon" by a Hou se commit-
t ee of Communl.st acUvltleA In la bor unions .• 
The Court pointed out, 1n footnote. t h a t 
t here was no record o! House aut horizat ion 
o r suc h a "continu ing 1nvestlgntlon." The 
Court continued. 
"In a.ny event, the authorizat ion of a 
' major lnvestl!{ntlon' by a full Commit tee 
m ust occur during t he term or the Congres.i 
In which the Investigation tal<es place. 
N etth.er t h e House of Representatives nor Its 
committees are continuinq bodies . Cf. Ander-
son ..• ; Marshall , •• " (EmphMis added ) 
(38 l US. at 707, fn. 4) 
(The Court al~o n oted tha t the House 
a.dopted It s R ules at th e begtnnt r~g of each 
Congress. The same ree.son could be applied 
to tne Senat e . The SENATE RULES cited 
•upra. ) 
The consl.~tent p a t tern shown by con.stltu-
t lonal provLslons a.nd Court declslo'1s con-
tlmac" In Acts or Congre~. 'P'or eumple : 2 
u.s C I 1 provide~: ~l'he TUesday nt'xt aftt-• 
th~ 1st Monday In November, 1n nery even 
n 11'\hCr~d yt'nr . t. ~ nhlt.<h~d ar t h(' d A\ !or 
the election, In each o! the States and Ter-
ritories o! the Unlted States, of Repre. nta-
tlves and Delegates to the Ccmgre•s commen -
1ng on the 3d day of January next there-
after . .. ," {Empha..~ls a.dded ) The pro\ Is ion 
!or adjournment, 2 U.S .C. § 198, recogul~cs 
that eneh Congress ende at t he end or an 
even-numbered yco.r. 
(2) The "pocket veto" decl.slons mnke clea r 
that the adjournment o! a Con~css ends It-S 
legislative l!fe. The question was exti'U.I\CIY 
considered In The Pocket Veto Cas<' ( O A·a-
nogan Inlfllms tl . U.<; ) , 279 US. 655 (1921!) . 
At !.•sue there was that part or the Con.,titu-
tlon which reeds a.s follows : 
Art. I , I 7, cl. :l: " . .. U &ny BUI .sll ,\11 not 
be returned by the Pre.sldent within ten Da.ys 
(Sundays excepted) after It shnll hn ve been 
presented to him, the Same sbnll be a Lnw, 
In like Manner as II he had signed It, tulle 5 
t he Congress by thelt Adjournment pr.,vl·n t 
Its Return, In which Case It shall n ot lJc a 
La w." 
Th e Court dC<'Ided that the word " ocl jou•u -
m c n t," 1\S us~d In that provision, w••· 110t 
limited to final adjournment. But the oplulou 
Rpeclfiea the effect ot such ftnal adjounmu•ut. 
The Court etated that It was conceded "that 
the President Is neceGoarlly preventf'd f rom 
returnlug a but by a 1\nal Adjournment or 1 he 
Congress, since 3UI'h. aajournment terminate.! 
the legislative erlrtence of thl' Con-
gress . . ." (Emphasis added.) (2 70 U S. 
at 681 l And the Court co ncluded : 
" • .. tt !ollowa, In our opinion, . . . t h a t, 
no return can be made to the House when It 
1s rtot In 9e35lon as a collective bodv a nd It~ 
members dispersed." (279 U.S . at 683.) 
The opinion also considered at pp. ~8.5-
690 a.n abortive att .. mpt by the Senate m 
1868 to provide for return of bills by t he 
President when Congress was not In ses.~lon. 
The elltenslve footnote reproduction or Sen-
ate debate sbaws the opinion of some &>n-
a.tors that the Beoa.te has no life after ad-
journment.) 
The Pockc t Veto Ca."' was rel!ed on 1 a 
Wrigh. t V . U .S., 302 U.S. 583 (1937) , to df•-
termtne that a "temporary recess" take n by 
one House during a ec~lon o! Conr;re'IS v ns 
n ot " adjournment ." But the Court emphn-
slzed the bases of the earlier decision . 
The factual dltrerenoe between the P a<·/.:l• t 
Veto Ca.se a nd the Wright case has re<'clvr d 
contempol'l\.r}' empha8ls. The Great Fnlls 
Tribune (Thlll11<lay, August 15, 1074, p 2. 
col. 7) reported that the United State~ C <>tlrL 
or Appeals (Dist. Col.) ha.d amrmed n Dl•-
trict Court bold1ng that Presiden t Kilt 1, 
" pocket-veto' o! the Family PracUee o ! ll1<·d -
lc1ne Act 1n 1970 could not stand. The p re. s 
reported that Clrc:mlt Judge 'ramm wrolc 
that " nn lntrasession adjourn ment o! Con-
gresa cloe8 not prevent a. president f rom re-
turning a bill he disapproves .... " (k.'mpha-
sls a.dded .) In Kenned11 v. Sampson , 3G-l F. 
Supp 1075 (D.C .D.C .) 1973), the trial court 
came to the same eonclu.,lon And t h e D is-
trict Judge wrote: "It mus t be kept In m ind 
that the Supreme Court 's language In t11e 
Pocket Veto CaJJe applied to an adjourn-
ment at th.e end of a se~lon and not to a 
short recea, durtng a -'63.sion, . . . ( p I 084 ) 
CONCLUSION 
It appears beyond argument t hat t h e ro-
paelty o! a Conr,rees to a.ct as n lcg l&lal! c 
body ends w'hen Congress adjourn•. The Con -
stitution, Art. I , § 1, provides: "All ler!l •l••-
ti t'P powers herein granted shall be v~ tf'd In 
a Congre., o! the Unltod States whlrh shnl• 
Mnslst of a Senate and !louse oj Repreun t -
atn·e~.'' (EmphiiSls added.) The provisloHs 
empowering House and SenaWI to function 
In lmpea.ehment appear In Article I, whi ch 
erotabllshes legillatwe powers. 
Without embarking on extensive e'<lrn-
l('gn1 research, one can fairly assert that tile 
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reeord of oonstlt1.1tlonal con ven l!onal deba te to fill-makes very plain to all the final re-
Rbows that lmpea.cb.meut was lnt.<'ndcd as n spons lbillty oi the Seno.te, on !a.cts and on 
leg,lsla.tl•e. not judic ia.!, check ou the exccn- la ze." Prof. Black emphasized the word 
tlve. (Polltlca.lly speaking, It ls a function '"fina.l"; I added the other emphasis. 
of the doctrine of separation of p owers. ) This language and other ln the same chap-
Whether the Senate, In conducting trial of ter relates tangentially to another point made 
an Impeachment, follows or adopts "judicial" In the memorandum. Prof. Black makes plain 
or " !ega.!" ruJes procedure, the proceeding his opinion, based on a rending of the Con-
itself is, constitutionally speaking, Jegisla- stltutlon and proceedings In the Convention, 
tlve. that the Senate's tria.! of an Impeachment is 
Any argument that a Senate s i tting In a legislative (not judicial) function. That 
tria l of an impeachment, has a llfe separate issue is critical, you w111 recall, to the ques-
and dlnstlnct !rom that of the Congress of tion of the power of the Senate to continue 
which lt was a. part so that it may continue a trial once begun past the date of adjourn-
trio.! past adjournment of the Congress .must ment of the Congress of whlch lt was a part. 
clear that formidable obs tacle. In the Wright I conclude by observing that Prof. Black 
case cited supra, the Supreme Court posed severa.l times repeats a principle wh1ch he 
the question whether "the Congress by their puts this way on page 53 : "The most power-
adjournment" prevented the President from ful maxim of constitutional law ls thAt Its 
returning the bill which was the subject O\_ rules ought to ma.ke sense." 
the dispute. The Court responded: "' ./ 
"'The Congress' did not adjourn. The Sen-
ate a.lone wa.s In recess. The Constitution 
creates and defines 'the Congress.' It con-
sists •or a Senate and House of Representa-
tives.' Art. I, § 1. The Senate is not 'the 
Congress.'" (Emphasis added.) 302 U .S. nt 
687.) 
OTHER REFERENCES 
Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment 
Power, 65 Nw. U . L. Rev. 719 (1970), does 
not contain matter helpful to solution of 
1Jlese problems. 
Eucutive Impeachment: Stealing Fire 
From the Go43, 9 New Eng. L. Rev. 257 ( 1974) , 
Is couta.lned in a bound volume missing from 
the library. 
Pro!. Charles Black's book IMPEACH-
MENT: A HANDBOOK (Yale. 1974) , ordered 
eome time ago tor Constitutional Law, has 
not been received from the publisher . 
.ADDENDUM TO MY AUGU5T 23 MEMORAJ\"lH:O M 
CONCERNING "llo:PEACHMENT" 
As that memorandum noted, IMPEACH-
MENT: A HANDBOOK, by Pro!. Chadles L. 
Black, Jr., of Ya.le, had not been received by 
its date. I have since rect'lved lilld read It, 
and olfer the followin g com m e nts. 
There l.s nothing directly i n the HAND-
BOOK on the questions raised directly in the 
memorandum. The only utterance even re-
motely related to the ques tion of Congress's 
power to impeach after res ignation appears 
In this sentence in Chapter 2, "Procedures": 
"It !leems to be optional wl.th the Senate 
whether to Impose the nddlt!ona.l penalty of 
dil!qual11katlon !rom olflce." (p. 13) 
In Chapter 4, entitled " Impeachment and 
"Ule Courts," Prof. Black takes a position 
markediy opposite suggested by Prof. Berger. 
Black's d!.ecussion, as did that or Berger, con-
oerna the question whether the Supreme 
Oourt h8.8 power to review a judgment of con-
viction In a Senate tria.! of a.n Impeachment. 
The preliminary question wh1ch I posed In 
the memorandum was dl.iferent: Whether the 
Surpeme Court has power to review Congres-
lllona.J determinations of Its power to im-
peach, try, and convict after a Pres ident has 
resigned. Bla.ck does not treat that question, 
but there Is matter In h is answer to his 
question which I want t o call to your a tten-
tion. 
On page 50 , Prof . Black writes: "So f ar a. 
I can find, not one syllable pronounced or 
written In or around the time o( the adop-
tion of the Constitution gives the faintest 
color to the 5upposltion that the Supreme 
Court was expected to have anything to do 
with Impeachments, or the trial thereof, or 
appea/.8 thereon." (emphasis nddf'd) the em-
phasized word "anything" Is an overstate-
ment, because his question ls nar rower tba 
that, and tt may be that it Is slmllar to ju-
dic1a.l dictum which 1s broader than the par-
ticular case demands. Nevertheless, when (on 
p . 62) Prof. Black seems to be restating hl ~ 
conclusion, he writes: " ... the wide dl.ifuslon 
or thle concept--that the courts haYe 110 role 
s J 7199 
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